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I. Introduction
This paper was originally prepared for the High Level Panel on Somali
Refugees convened by the High Commissioner for Refugees to take
place in Geneva on 13 and 14 November 2013. The Panel is part of a
Global Initiative the High Commissioner has launched to rally international support for creative, meaningful and transformative solutions
for Somali refugees.
Intended to provide context and lay the ground for in-depth discussion by the Panel, the paper overviews the nature, trends and issues
in Somali refugee displacement in the near region while also touching
on the pertinent aspects of Somali refugee displacement in other parts
of Africa, the Gulf and further afield. It provides a brief overview of
the history and evolution of the estimated 500,000 Somali refugees in
Kenya, 250,000 in Ethiopia, 260,000 in Yemen, 20,000 in Djibouti and
20,500 in Uganda while including pertinent information on internal
displacement. The numbers are large but should not mask the heterogeneity within each host country’s refugee population. Some refugees
have been displaced for three generations; others are recent arrivals.
Past actions in managing displacement and return in the region are
reviewed and the conditions facing the Somali refugees examined. It
becomes clear that varying solutions may have to be pursued for different groups and some situations may have more or fewer options than
others. It is however not the purpose of the paper itself to reveal the
new solutions. Its principal objective is rather to extract lessons from
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recent history and, in that context, begin an account of the challenges
in thinking about durable solutions in the contemporary context.
II. History and Evolution of Somali Forced Displacement
A. General trends
Somalia is often viewed as the scene of ceaseless violence and displacement since the collapse of the state in 1991. However, the interplay of
conflict and displacement has seen different phases, configurations and
evolutions. Prior to the genesis of the displacement that has endured to
the present day, Somalia was itself a major refugee hosting country, the
home to an estimated 650,000 Ethiopian Somalis from the 1977–78 border war with Ethiopia. Those most affected were people living close to
the contested border where the fighting was concentrated. The large
numbers of refugees in the country contributed to a distortion of the
national economy as the Government’s use of aid resources as a major
source of revenue played a major role in incorporating aid into the
political economy of Somalia, a trend that has continued to this day.
The genesis of contemporary Somali displacement is indicated in
Figure 1 below which shows the fluctuations in the total numbers of
people displaced since the mid-1980s. The graph shows peaks in both
internal displacement and refugee flows during the early 1990s at the
onset of the conflict and state collapse and between 2007 and 2012
when escalated fighting and drought conditions contributed to widespread famine and emergency conditions. It also shows periods of
relative calm when migration slowed and returns to some areas were
possible.
The first significant refugee displacements out of Somalia started
with the events that would lead to the collapse of President Siad Barre’s
regime in 1991. Since then, Somali refugees and internally displaced
persons have remained the most consistently protracted displaced
population in the Horn of Africa. However, migration and mobility
have featured as key elements in the political and economic history of
the region for much longer. Since at least the 1970s, Somalis have been
displaced at varying scales in response to different dynamics involving
conflict, natural disaster, and economic hardship.
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Figure 1: Somalia displacement estimates
Source: A. Lindley and L. Hammond (forthcoming 2014) ‘Histories and Contemporary Challenges of Somali Crisis and Mobility’ in A. Lindley, ed. Crisis
and Migration, Abingdon: Routledge.1

B. Initial phase of Somali refugee displacement: 1988–1991 and after
The principal causes of displacement during the 1990s are usually
identified as a complex emergency involving conflict, state collapse
and drought. However, beneath these banner headlines, it is important
to look for the ways that these dynamics impacted different groups
within the country. In the build-up to the collapse of the state, the government’s manipulation of clan dynamics made clan identity a principal source of both security and conflict and access to political power
(both formal and informal) and resources. The establishment of state
boundaries in the post-colonial period also meant that many clans and
sub-clans occupied territory that spanned two countries and thus were
able to exploit economic, social and citizenship ties and claims in multiple countries.
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As the state of Somalia began to fragment and collapse, and in the
period following the collapse, people withdrew into their clans for
security even as warlords and clan militia leaders fomented hatred
between themselves and their followers to further their own quest for
power and resources. Violent clashes between clans, combined with
the effects of a severe drought, sent people fleeing for safer areas either
in urban centres in Somalia or to safe havens in neighbouring countries. An estimated 250,000 people died during the 1992–93 emergency
and as many as 800,000 refugees fled to Kenya and Ethiopia in 1992.2
Nearly 2 million people were internally displaced.

1. Displacement to Ethiopia and Djibouti
The civil war that ultimately ousted Somalia’s President Mohamed
Siad Barre and brought down the government began in 1988 in the
northwest of the country, the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. The rebel Somali National Movement (SNM) mounted attacks
against the Government of Somalia which for its part staged land and
air campaigns against towns throughout Somaliland.
In 1991, the number of registered refugees in Ethiopia totaled
628,526.3 Most of them were from Somaliland and other parts of northern Somalia who had fled this early fighting. The refugees lived in nine
camps established largely along clan lines with smaller numbers selfsettled in local communities. Significant numbers of destitute Ethiopian
Somalis from local communities who shared clan ties with the refugees
also moved into the camps and registered as refugees.4 The camps also
received some Ethiopian nationals who had originally fled to Somalia
and were now re-displaced back to their country of origin. However,
many of the Ethiopian Somalis who participated in this “self-repatriation under duress” settled in local communities.5 UNHCR organized
an assistance programme to help the returnees integrate into local
communities. Over 550,000 were provided with cash grants and six
months food rations.
Fleeing northward from the fighting in Somaliland, over 90,000 refugees sought shelter in three camps in Djibouti.6 For a country of only
half a million people and already hosting another 13,000 refugees from
Ethiopia, this was an extremely heavy burden.
In Ethiopia, refugees arrived on foot in the camps located just across
the border having traveled for weeks without adequate food or water,
destitute and now reliant on refugee assistance. It took nearly a year
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for emergency conditions to subside. High rates of malnutrition and
mortality in Hartisheik A, the largest of the camps in Ethiopia, were
attributed to inadequate and irregular rations, high incidence of communicable diseases (including diarrhea and hepatitis) and low enrolment in supplementary feeding programmes.7
Even after the initial emergency conditions in the camps had stabilized, life was difficult for the refugees. Relief distributions were
sometimes sporadic, and most of the camps were located in remote
areas away from any significant infrastructure or market. Over time,
Hartisheik camp became an urbanized catchment unto itself, sitting on
the border near Somalia and becoming a major transit point for agricultural products and imported items from outside the region.
Fighting in Somaliland began to subside in the early 1990s. Encouraged by improvements in security and wanting to escape the harshness of the camps in Ethiopia, an estimated 400,000 refugees returned
on their own without assistance between 1991 and 94.8 However,
large-scale assisted repatriation was not possible until 1997 due to a
resurgence of fighting during 1994 and 1995 in Hargeisa (see further
below).

2. Displacement to Kenya and Yemen
As momentum against the Somali government grew, efforts to remove
Siad Barre from power intensified. The conflict spread to Puntland
and South Central Somalia, causing displacement towards Kenya, and
from Puntland to Yemen, to accelerate. Between 1991 and 1992, the
number of refugees in Kenya increased by nearly 280,000. Refugee
numbers in Yemen doubled from 30,000 to 60,000. Drought in 1991 and
1992 exacerbated the effects of the violence, and disrupted food production, availability of water for human and animal use, local markets
and income from international trade. Pastoral and labour migration
had long been “normal” coping strategies but such movement became
impossible given the fighting going on in the country. This caused
malnutrition and mortality rates to skyrocket and people to abandon
their homes. One survey of a displaced camp in Baidoa town found
under-five mortality rates of 69/10,000 persons/day—35 times higher
than the emergency threshold—caused by malnutrition, measles and
dysentery.9
It is important to recognize the ways that the conflict and drought
affected Somalis with different livelihood backgrounds since this influ-

59

Bildhaan

Vol. 13

enced the composition of the refugee population. While displacement
was occurring from all parts of Somalia, those from South-Central
regions were particularly hard-hit, coming as they did from agricultural and agro-pastoral areas and thus relying on access to farmland
and to agricultural markets more than their northern pastoralist neighbours. The south is also more heterogeneous in terms of clan makeup,
and fighting between clans often resulted in the seizure of clan territories which deprived people of their main source of subsistence,
making distress migration inevitable. So-called minority clan members—members of the Rahanweyn clan group and those who have
come to be known as Somali Bantu or Jareer were particularly disadvantaged, lacking a political voice or armed militias to protect their
interests. Their exclusion has continued to the present day, and their
numbers are disproportionately reflected in refugee populations in
neighbouring countries.
Kenya had hosted approximately 30,000 refugees prior to March
1991. Within a year, the number soared to nearly 300,000. Refugee
camps were located close to the border with Somalia and along the
coast with the Kenyan government reluctant to relocate the refugees
further inland due to internal security concerns. Emergency conditions
in the camps prevailed until 1993, with high levels of malnutrition and
outbreaks of measles, cholera and other diseases causing many who
were already weakened to die. In 1993, Human Rights Watch documented high incidences of rape, physical attack and theft in the camps.
The perpetrators included local populations who were “as indigent as
the refugee population but…not receiving relief assistance,”10 as well
as fellow refugees and well-armed bandits from inside Somalia.
Boat crossings from Somalia to Yemen increased during this period.
Yemen hosted 30,000 refugees in 1991. That number doubled the following year, beginning a long and tragic story involving thousands
of people drowning or falling victim to unscrupulous smugglers. In
response to the influx, UNHCR began operations in Yemen for Somali
refugees in 1992.
Once health and nutrition conditions in the Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti camps improved from 1993, donor support began to wane. This,
together with a modest improvement in security conditions inside
Somalia and return of the rains, encouraged some people to return to
Somalia relatively quickly. Between 1992 and 1994, UNHCR carried
out a Cross Border Operation into areas of southern Somalia in order
to prepare for and facilitate return. During that period, 360 Quick
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Impact Projects (QIPs) were put in place with a value of US$7.9 million
out of an overall budget for return and rehabilitation of $35.6 million.
It is estimated that more than 170,000 people repatriated during this
period. Some found return unsustainable and found their way back
into Kenya (see Lindley and Hammond 2014 forthcoming).
In 1994, six camps were closed in Kenya as a result of the repatriation
and some relocation of people to the Dadaab and Kakuma camps.11 A
1996 evaluation of the Cross Border Operation however noted that
while successful in encouraging people to return the effectiveness of
the operation was hampered in several ways. Three of the most important limitations of the operation were a) the likelihood of deteriorating
security conditions inside Somalia, thereby triggering fresh displacement; b) the short-term impact of most of the QIPs such that they were
unlikely to be sustained by local administrations or communities who
were more concerned with their immediate survival, and c) a lack of
collaboration with other organizations with a mandate for rehabilitation and development, meaning that “UNHCR in effect launched the
project alone.”12
Back in the camps in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the refugees
who remained adapted to life there, however precarious and insecure.
Unable for the most part to move legally and freely, seek employment,
or engage in farming or livestock rearing outside the camps, a sort
of urbanized, subsidized existence developed. Some refugees found
ways of supplementing their support from their ration entitlements
by working informally. Schools and clinics were set up to support the
refugees. Resettlement to third countries benefitted only a relatively
small number of refugees.
C. 1996–2006: Relative calm yet a still vulnerable population
From 1996 to 2006, a period of relative calm prevailed in Somalia. The
number of new arrivals to refugee camps slowed as people relocated
on their own to urban centres inside the host countries or returned to
Somalia to try to resume their agricultural or agro-pastoral activities
or to take their chances in the larger Somali cities and towns. Many
of those displaced from Somaliland were encouraged to return by the
establishment of the Government of Somaliland and an end to the
civil war there. In the southern and central regions, pockets of stability developed where effective local administrative structures were
established by communities themselves. What violence prevailed was
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relatively short-term and localized. However, one of the negative hallmarks of this time was the entrenchment of humanitarian aid inside
Somalia as a key resource to be used as both a means and an end to
obtaining political power. In the absence of government revenues and
other economic opportunities, those who had access to this resource
and who could use it to reward their followers, were able to rise to the
top of the informal political and economic apparatus.13
With the slowing of displacement from Somalia to neighbouring
countries and recognition that conditions in some parts of the country had improved considerably, the late 1990s featured a focus on
organized return of approximately 200,000 refugees14 from Ethiopia
to Somaliland. UNHCR distributed cash grants, food assistance for a
period of nine months and limited household items to returnees who
were supported by the Somaliland Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction (MRRR). Their return was facilitated by
provision of hundreds of QIPS between 1997 and 2005. Many of these
projects have been criticized for lack of sustainability and failing to
make a difference in ensuring returnees’ access to basic services and
livelihoods.
Security concerns and lack of administrative capacity prevented
large-scale return of people from Kenya to South Central Somalia
although smaller numbers went back from Ethiopia and Kenya to
Puntland and from Djibouti to Mogadishu. Life after return proved
particularly challenging given the extremely vulnerable state of the
civilians and their inability to provide support to their returning relatives. Many people repatriated from refugee camps to Somalia only
to become internally displaced persons living in destitution in and
around urban centres. In 2013, thousands of former returnees remain
encamped in settlements around the major towns of Somaliland and
Puntland.
D. Renewed Displacement 2006–2012
The relative calm that had prevailed for a decade was shattered in the
latter half of 2006. The Union of Islamic Courts, which had begun to set
up an administration in Mogadishu and some of the larger cities and
which had enjoyed widespread support in many parts of Somalia, was
ousted by Ethiopian troops with support from its international strategic partners.
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This perceived invasion of Somalia by a foreign army served as a
rallying point for the emerging al Shabaab movement. Al Shabaab
was a new configuration of hardline militias that had previously been
active in Wahabist-Salafist movements in the country. It took as its raison d’etre the defense of Somalia against what it called the aggression
of foreign invaders. The violence began to escalate dramatically from
the beginning of 2007, with indiscriminate violence particularly in and
around Mogadishu prompting many people who had managed to survive in the city for years despite the insecurity to flee, making this the
most violent period in Mogadishu since the collapse of the state.
People fled in stages, seeking refuge first with their rural relatives
and, when the coping strategies of these hosts became exhausted, both
those displaced from the cities and their hosts began the move out of
the country towards the refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.15
The spiraling displacement from Somalia was compounded by the
shrinking humanitarian space for aid organizations operating in the
country and the use of displacement as strategies employed by both
sides of the conflict. Al Shabaab sought to prevent people from moving
out of areas under its control which included most of South Central
Somalia and Mogadishu until September 2011. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia sought to expand its area of influence by offering assistance to people in the few places under its control,
effectively luring them into the areas it administered. As a result, large
numbers of people poured into urban IDP centres on such a scale that
the government lacked the capacity to respond effectively. By June
2012, ICRC reported that there were 368,288 IDPs living in Mogadishu,
40% of whom had come into the city within the preceding 12 months.16
Some aid agencies were able to work in areas under al Shabaab control quietly and on a small scale, although those providing food aid
and medical support (particularly vaccination) faced resistance from al
Shabaab which saw their assistance as diabolical.
In 2011, the serious drought that had been building over the previous two years and the economic effects of the conflict and restrictions on movement and trade that had gripped much of South Central
Somalia for the preceding four years resulted in the emergence of the
worst famine the region had seen for 25 years. The interriverine areas
of Somalia (between the Juba and Shabelle rivers) which are normally
the most productive agricultural areas of the country were the worst
affected. The use of mobility for strategic interests by warring parties continued: al Shabaab tried to prevent people from leaving the
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country, attacking refugees on their way to the Kenyan and Ethiopian
borders, and even carrying out attacks inside the Dadaab refugee complex. The TFG, with support from AMISOM troops, continued to try
to attract people to areas under its control. These dynamics were abetted by international donor policies that prevented aid agencies from
disbursing funds that might end up in the hands of al Shabaab, and
by al Shabaab’s decisions to ban most agencies working in areas it controlled. This effectively meant that most of the areas affected by famine
were out of aid agencies’ reach.
The result of these combined factors was massive displacement
within the region: 113,500 new arrivals were registered in the Dadaab
camps between January and August 2011. In Ethiopia, which had been
hosting 40,000 refugees in two camps near Dolo Ado during 2009–2010,
100,000 new arrivals were recorded. (Smaller numbers were being sheltered in camps near the city of Jijiga in the east.) The Ethiopian government established three new camps to house them, but emergency
conditions prevailed until at least three months after the declaration
of a famine in July. A nutritional assessment of the Dolo Ado camps in
Ethiopia cited early surveys among the new arrivals showing global
acute malnutrition (GAM) rates of 50% (15% is considered indicative
of a serious emergency) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates of
approximately 23%. Mortality rates for children under five were twice
the level indicating an emergency, at 4/10,000/day. These indicators
show how severely weakened the population was when it arrived in
the camps. It took three months for emergency conditions to subside.17
Arrivals in Yemen also increased dramatically: by between 15,000
and 20,000 each year from 2005 to 2008 and, between 2009 and 2012,
from 161,468 to 226,909.18
E. The post-transitional period, 2012–present
In September 2011, al Shabaab carried out a “tactical withdrawal” from
most of Mogadishu under pressure from TFG and AMISOM forces
which successfully gained control of many of the larger towns in the
south over the following twelve months. These gains were accompanied by a political process that brought about an end to the transitional
period and the selection of a new Parliament, President, Prime Minister and Cabinet. In November 2012, al Shabaab’s final remaining urban
base, Kismayo, was captured by Somali Federal Government (SFG)/
AMISOM forces.
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At the time of writing, the Somali Federal Government with the
support of AMISOM is in control of the major urban areas in South
Central Somalia. Al Shabaab however still controls large swathes of
rural territory. Through regular attacks in Mogadishu, Kismayo and
other cities in Somalia, as well as attacks in Kenya and Uganda, it has
demonstrated that it is still a regional security threat.
Following the ejection of al Shabaab from Kismayo in September
2012, a power struggle ensued over the administration of Jubbaland,
an area of southwestern Somalia which lies along the Kenya border. A
fragile agreement is in place between the Somali Federal Government
and Ahmed Madoobe, leader of the Ras Kambooni militia, which gives
him authority as President of the region with some oversight by the
SFG. There is some hope that greater security in Jubbaland may make
it possible for refugees to return to that area and that the area may also
act as a buffer zone supporting people who might otherwise seek refuge in Kenya. While this vision may hold some merit for the long term,
the questions about exactly what the relationship will be between the
SFG and the regional administration have not been settled. Until these
relationships are agreed to, it will not be possible to put in place the
necessary services and to ensure that relief and development organizations have access to the area to support eventual large-scale return.
These challenges of realizing a functioning federal system are also key
to promoting governance and return in other areas.
Despite the challenges the new government faces, the post-transition
period has brought renewed optimism about the future of the country.
New arrivals in neighbouring countries have slowed to a trickle. Host
countries, encouraged by the SFG’s successes and in response to public
pressure over the terrorist attacks for which Al Shabaab has claimed
responsibility, have pushed for the acceleration of mass return of the
refugees. Perhaps out of optimism, but also likely in reaction to growing intolerance towards them and to the insecurity they have experienced in the refugee camps (see below), many refugees are preparing
themselves for the possibility of some form of return. As will be discussed below, significant obstacles to realizing this ambition remain.
Since the escalation of displacement within the region, Yemen has
continued to be a major destination for not only Somali nationals but
also people of other nationalities who use the Somali ports to cross the
Gulf of Aden. In 2012, three quarters of the more than 100,000 arrivals in Yemen from Somalia were Ethiopian nationals.19 Yet, when the
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violence in Somalia was at its peak, most of the arrivals in Yemen were
Somali.
The crossing from Bosasso and other smaller Somali ports is notoriously treacherous. People travel in small, often unseaworthy vessels.
They are often at the mercy of unscrupulous smugglers who abandon them at sea or push them into the water just off the coast. The
Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat reported that between 2010 and
2013 “hundreds of people have been reported drowned or killed by
smugglers. Upon arrival, some migrants report being held hostage in
Yemen by the smugglers demanding extra payment/ransom. Equally
there are reports of coercion, rape, murder, kidnapping, extortion and
physical assault.” RMMS reports that reported drowning and killings
have decreased significantly in 2013 but cases of kidnappings have
risen dramatically. It concludes: “There may be a case to argue that
the change could be attributed to the rising cases of kidnapping of
migrants for ransom, which makes them of more value alive.”20
Many of those who make it from Somalia to Yemen intend to move
further into Saudi Arabia but find themselves stranded at the border.
By 2013, 25,000 migrants, many of them Somali, were stranded at the
border town of Haradh. Many Somali refugees who remain in the
country move into the capital city, Sana’a, to search for work. There,
they must compete with other refugees including new arrivals from
Syria, as well as with internally displaced Yemenis and poor local residents.
III. Current Refugee Situation
Today, it is estimated that 1.5 million out of a total population of
approximately 10 million Somali nationals live outside the country in
what may be termed both the “near” and “far” diasporas. Approximately 1 million of those people live in or close to the Horn of Africa
Region. The current Somali refugee populations in the main host countries can be seen in the table below:
A. Life for Somalis in Refugee Camps in the Region
Except for Yemen, across the region, camps have emerged as the principal model for accommodating and dealing with the Somali refugees.
This has been not least because of the sheer magnitude of the problems.
At the same time, encampment is considered necessary to minimize the
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perceived security risks associated with the refugees or the spillover
of the conflict from Somalia. Local integration of the refugees faces
various legal, official and practical obstacles, including, particularly,
in those cases where it is not officially allowed. The security services
of the host countries have maintained responsibility for security in the
refugee camps. In Kenya, with overall responsibility to co-ordinate the
response having initially been delegated to UNHCR, the Government
has increasingly taken over primary responsibility for managing the
situation with the passage of the country’s Refugee Act in 2006. Ethiopia has historically managed the security and administration of its
refugee camps through its Administration for Refugee and Returnee
Affairs (ARRA), which is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with
funding from UNHCR and supported by NGO implementing partners.
Djibouti’s National Eligibility Commission processes asylum claims
but UNHCR provides most funding and logistical support to refugees.
Camps in Ethiopia and Kenya are located far from urban areas and
refugees have faced significant constraints to their movement and their
ability to support themselves through employment or production. As
the capacity of the camps has been exceeded, opening new camps for
Somalis has in some cases proved a slow and difficult process as host
countries worry about the possibility that refugees will not repatriate
quickly and will bring security problems with them.
The Dadaab and Kakuma camps, which in 2013 were the two
remaining refugee camp complexes in Kenya, were established in
the early 1990s to cope with the influx of refugees from the region.
Dadaab was originally intended to house no more than 90,000 people
but quickly filled beyond capacity to become for a time the world’s
largest refugee camp complex. Kakuma in northwest Kenya, which
hosted not only Somali refugees but also those from Sudan and Ethiopia, was also strained beyond its ability to effectively serve refugees
living there. Following the increased influxes in 2011, the Government

67

Bildhaan

Vol. 13

opened three new camps (Ifo 2 East, Ifo 2 West and Kambioos) in the
Dadaab complex, but is still not able to adequately provide for the
needs of all refugees there.
In Ethiopia, refugees are housed in camps near the southern town
of Dolo Ado across the border from Somalia’s Gedo Region. The camps
are cut off from communications and trade networks and are not
endowed with the social service and physical infrastructure that other
camps in the region may take for granted.
There are significant clan differences between the inhabitants of
the camps in the different host countries. In Kenya, more than half of
Dadaab’s residents belong to one of the Darod sub-clans, with 12%
each belonging to Dir and Hawiye and 6% Bantu. One third of Kakuma’s population is reported to be Bantu, 20% Hawiye and less than one
quarter Darod.21 In Ethiopia, it is estimated that 60% of the 2011–12
arrivals in Dolo Ado were from the Digil-Rahanweyn clan, which is
looked down on by the other “majority clans.” The host population
around the Dolo Ado camps is not from the same clans, although
some speak the same dialect of Af-May, which limits opportunities for
local integration or self-settlement. In Yemen, minority groups are also
heavily represented.
It is estimated that there are slightly more women in the camps than
men, and that more than half of the refugees living in the camps in
Kenya are under 18 years of age.22 Approximately 10,000 refugees are
reportedly “third generation”—they and their parents were born in
the camps, and their families have lived there for two decades. These
refugees have very different types of experiences and expectations
of the future than those who have come to the camps more recently.
Those who have lived in the camps for prolonged periods are less
likely to have property and active social ties to return to. They have
become urbanized through camp life to such an extent that it may no
longer be reasonable to expect them to contemplate returning to Somalia to adopt rural (pastoral, agro-pastoral or agricultural) livelihoods.
At the same time, most lack the education and skills to be able to find
employment in urban areas even if such jobs were to exist—which at
the present time they clearly do not. Refugees have expressed a desire
for vocational training in the refugee camps in preparation for their
onward movement (whether to their country of origin or to other destinations). Those who arrived in 2011 had significantly less education
or training than those who had been living in the camps since at least
2006.23
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For those living in the camps, life is a waiting game. As noted above,
refugees are typically restricted in working or traveling outside the
camps, although many do try to eke out a living through petty trade
or employment in small businesses. Security in the camps in Kenya in
particular has been a profound challenge: attacks on refugees and aid
workers by al Shabaab as well as nonaligned bandits are a frequent
phenomenon and have resulted in momentary suspension or restriction of assistance operations. A 2013 report by the Heritage Institute
for Policy Studies, a think-tank based in Mogadishu, found that many
of the estimated 15,000 refugees who have returned from Kenya in the
past year were prompted more by refugees’ concern about insecurity
in the camps than by optimism about the conditions facing them inside
Somalia on their return.24
Although the vast majority of the region’s refugees have been camp
dwellers, no account of displacement from Somalia would be complete
without considering “self-settlement.” Large Somali refugee populations, partly in response to the insecurity within the camps as well as
to avoid the livelihood challenges that camp life entails, have chosen to
go without significant international refugee assistance and settle within
urban areas of the host countries. In Kenya in 2011, it was estimated
that 100,000 Somali refugees were living in Nairobi. Large numbers
were also living in Mombasa and other cities, as well as throughout
rural communities in the northeast of the country. A directive by the
Kenyan government in 2012 for all refugees living in towns in Kenya to
be relocated to the camps was overturned by the Kenyan High Court
but is now under appeal.
In Ethiopia in 2009, it was estimated that 160,000 refugees were living in Addis Ababa and other Ethiopian towns, unregistered and without assistance.25 No attempt has been made to officially accommodate
refugees in urban areas of the country.
An alternative model to hosting refugees can be seen in Uganda,
where refugees are ableto move freely between camps and urban
areas. Omata and Kaplan cite figures of 23,669 Somali refugees living
in Uganda—11,007 in the Nakivale refugee camp and the remaining
12,662 in the capital city, Kampala. Refugees in camps are given access
to farmland: some farm it while others rent it out to other farmers.
Refugees in the camps and cities draw on their social ties to facilitate
trade and build businesses and have been relatively successful at providing for themselves. This model of relatively freer movement and
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access to economic activities may be a useful model for other countries
to consider.
In all of the host countries, most self-settled refugees lack proof
of legal status. They face difficulty in finding formal employment,
accessing social services, and securing legal redress, effectively living
as stateless individuals. Undocumented Somalis living in cities face a
precarious situation. There is increasing resentment on the part of host
country citizens towards them especially following the attacks throughout the region for which al Shabaab has claimed responsibility. In the
Kenyan capital, the September 2013 attack on the Westgate Shopping
Centre was the worst but certainly not the first such example. Attacks
have also been carried out in Mombasa and in the northern districts of
Garissa and Wajir. In Uganda, an attack was carried out in 2010 on a
crowded restaurant during the World Cup final. Local populations in
all of the host countries also feel that Somalis place a burden on urban
social services infrastructure and house prices. In recent months, there
have been increased calls by the public for the Kenyan government to
move towards sending refugees back to Somalia as soon as possible.26
B. Internally displaced persons
There are an estimated 1.1 million internally displaced persons living
inside Somalia at the moment27—most in inhospitable conditions in
urban areas. Three hundred thousand are living in squalid conditions
in Mogadishu.
Reports of IDPs being the victims of theft, looting, assault and sexual violence—including at the hands of security forces charged with
protecting them—are widespread, and providing effective protection
and assistance is a huge challenge for the government and aid agencies. Hundreds of thousands more displaced are living in areas outside
government control and are thus out of reach of most aid agencies.
In January 2013, the SFG announced a plan to relocate people from
the IDP settlements near the city centre to new camps on the outskirts of the city to enable reconstruction of the main business districts.
Implementation of the plan has been slowed (but not stopped) due to
protests on the part of the displaced, those who claim a right to the
land being used for the new settlements, and by human rights groups
as well on the grounds that security conditions and infrastructure were
inadequate to receive people.
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Return of IDPs is hampered by continued insecurity in the areas of
origin as well as the fact that many people have lost their access to land
and/or property and therefore lack the means to support themselves in
rural areas. They also know that if they return to their areas of origin
they will not be able to access most forms of humanitarian assistance
and thus remain in the displaced centres despite the poor conditions
there.
Solutions for returning refugees will need to be considered together
with those for IDPs if those returning are to avoid becoming displaced
in their country of origin or being forced to compete with IDPs for
meager resources.
C. Global dimension of Somali displacement: A transnational
community
Somalis in many ways exemplify what the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees has termed “Global Refugees.” As noted above, as many
as 500,000 Somali refugees live in what might be termed the “far”
diaspora,28 with large concentrations in the United States (the largest
communities being in Minneapolis MN Columbus OH, Atlanta GA,
and Washington DC), Canada (Toronto and Ottawa the main centres)
and Europe (the UK hosts 100,000–200,000 Somalis, and smaller populations are settled in Italy, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany and the
Netherlands). There are an estimated 30,000 Somalis living in Dubai
and communities in other Gulf countries as well, though many have
migrated as students or businesspeople rather than as refugees.
Other African countries with significant Somali refugee populations
include South Africa (estimated 30,000 by December 2013) and Egypt
(8,000).29 Many Somali refugees experience considerable hostility from
host and other migrant populations in host countries who see them as
competing for employment opportunities and whatever social support
is available. They derive limited social and economic support from
other Somali migrants.
Whether they are refugees, economic migrants or students, Somalis
settled in the diaspora provide important resources to refugees living
closer to Somalia through their remittance support. Remittances to
refugees in the region are estimated at $1.3 to 2 billion a year and are
received by approximately 40% of the population living in Somalia.
Funds received are spent on essential household expenses such as
food, education and healthcare. In a recent study conducted by FAO,
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one third of remittance recipients reported that they would face food
insecurity if remittances were to be suspended. Remittances also reach
into the camps. In her 2006 study, Horst estimates that 10% to 15% of
refugees in Dadaab received remittances. According to a later study
by the United States Bureau for Populations, Refugees and Migration
(PRM), more than one-third (37%) said they received remittance support.30
The lack of a telecommunications network in the camps in Ethiopia
has been cited by refugees as a severe impediment to their livelihoods
since they are not able to contact relatives to ask for help, and remittance companies that rely on mobile telephones to complete transactions are not able to work in the camps.31 In the DRC study, 10% of
refugees in Ethiopia reported receiving remittances (most of these are
likely to be refugees living closer to Jijiga in the east of the country).32
Since 2012, many diaspora Somalis have gone back to Somalia on
reconnaissance trips, to check on family members and property, work
in the new government or explore the possibilities of investing in the
country. Much has been made of these returns as being indicative of
a significant change in the security situation in Mogadishu and as
evidence that conditions are now ripe for large-scale return. It should
however be noted that most of these returns are undertaken by people
who have permanent residence or citizenship in another country and
usually are relatively successful economically. They have the legal and
financial ability to come and go from Somalia (usually Mogadishu) as
the security situation dictates. If security deteriorates they can leave
the country immediately. Most would-be returnees from neighbouring
countries who lack the legal and financial means to re-emigrate if they
find return unsustainable would face a very different situation.
The experience of the wider diaspora shows that engagement with
multiple places at the same time, the constant use of social and economic networks across great distances and international borders are
important individual and collective survival strategies upon which as
many as 40% of the Somali population relies in one way or another.33
Recognizing the importance of managing risk and improving resilience by actively living in multiple locations, it is likely to be necessary
to provide some guarantees for potential returnees to be able to come
and go for a time until they are well established and the security situation in the country stabilizes.

72

Laura Hammond

IV. Issues and Problematics Concerning Solutions
for Somali Refugees
As noted above, return to Somalia has been hampered by the rapidly
changing security environment inside the country as well as by lack of
economic opportunities for those returning to the country. Return to
Somaliland was relatively “durable” if measured from the perspective
of whether or not people re-emigrated, and by the fact that Ethiopia’s
refugee camps, including what was once the world’s largest refugee
camp, Hartisheik, were eventually closed (although hosting of refugees from southern Somalia continued and was scaled up from 2007
onwards). However many of those who were repatriated to Somaliland and Puntland continue to live as IDPs, in tents with limited water
and food supply, in impoverished conditions.
Resettlement of Somali refugees has been ongoing over the past two
decades. Between 1995 and 2010, 55,422 Somali refugees were resettled
from the region.34 The US has been the largest recipient of resettled
Somali refugees. Other resettlement countries include Austria, Canada,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Resettlement is ongoing from all camps except those in Dolo
Ado. As of mid-2012, DRC reported that 16,000 refugees in Kenya were
being processed for resettlement.
Given the protracted nature of the displacement within the region
has been the de facto outcome for many refugees. Those who have settled outside the camps have established social ties and many have built
viable livelihoods for themselves in their adopted country. However,
host countries are cautious about large-scale local integration. This
solution is thus potentially feasible for only small numbers of refugees
for whom return and/or onward resettlement is not practicable, but
only if other solutions are being promoted at the same time for the
majority.
A study by the Danish Refugee Council in Ethiopia and Kenya in
2012 found that one third of the refugees would, under conditions prevailing at the time, choose to be resettled if they had the option. A third
said that they would return to Somalia and smaller numbers said that
they would like to settle amongst the local population. If security and
economic conditions in Somalia improved, more than half of refugees
consulted said that they would opt to repatriate.35
One of the main obstacles to return is the availability of farmland.
The DRC report says: “A significant difference exists between refugees
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who arrived before 2006 (40% say that they had access to land [before
displacement] and less than half of them believe they would still have
access to it) and those who arrived in 2011–12 (80% had access to land,
with less than half believing they would still have access to it and an
important [unspecified] proportion saying they did not know).”36
Given a lack of meaningful durable solutions among those most
commonly advocated by UNHCR and host and donor countries, many
refugees have been carving out a solution of their own based on creative exploitation of the opportunities presented by having access to
transnational social networks. Remittances from relatives living in the
“far-off” diaspora—North America, Europe, and the Middle East in
particular—provides supplementary income support to those living in
refugee camps and in local communities in the Horn. Those who are
better off financially often manage to move out into the wider diaspora
themselves and become supporters of those living closer to Somalia.
This transnational community provides resilience and a risk management function that enables people to survive in communities where
employment opportunities are lacking, and for those living further
away to contribute to and manage family matters, business activities, and even political engagement even while they live further away.
Should large-scale return to Somalia become a reality, the involvement
of the diaspora in helping to support returning relatives will be key.
Large-scale return will depend first and foremost on the ability of
Somali refugees to return home in safety. This will mean an expansion
of areas under government control, particularly into rural areas. It
will also mean an expansion of government ability to provide services
and protection to returnees coming to urban areas. However, in practice there is likely to be continuing and increased pressure from host
countries and donor nations to find solutions to protracted displacement and ultimately for refugees to return to Somalia. Balancing these
pressures with international responsibilities to assure protection of
refugees and returnees will be a major challenge and there is likely to
be an important role for regional actors (IGAD and the African Union
in particular) in this regard.
With the implementation of facilitated large-scale return, the earlier-mentioned entrenchment of aid within the Somali economy would
again loom large. Repatriation will bring needed resources to communities but will also create an opportunity for those who have become
adept at manipulating, diverting, and benefiting politically and materially from externally provided assistance. Funneling of large amounts
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of resources through governance structures will have to be accompanied by financial accountability and the ability to take decisive action
in cases of corruption or fraud without which the effectiveness of any
return and reintegration operation would be hampered and potentially
further insecurity triggered.
V. Conclusion
Displacement within and from Somalia is one of the longest-running
crises in the world today. One in six Somalis presently lives outside the
country. Host countries in the Greater Horn of Africa are concerned
about the economic, social and political cost of continuing to provide
protection and assistance to large numbers of Somali refugees. They
are keen to see solutions which will diminish these responsibilities.
Many Somali refugees themselves desire to return to their country
either permanently or on a part-time basis depending on their personal
circumstances. Given also the different circumstances that have generated refugee flows, the different needs of long-stayers versus newer
arrivals, the uncertain fate of the property that many have left behind
in Somalia, the precariousness of the current security and economic
situation in the country and the size and heterogeneity of the refugee populations, varying solutions will have to be found for different
groups of refugees, promoting return for some, integration for others
and onward resettlement for still others.
In respect of return to Somalia, decisions about when to initiate or
facilitate repatriation, how to balance properly the requirements of
return with those of national reconstruction, about meeting the needs
of vulnerable IDP and local populations, and how best to promote
post-return social integration will be exceedingly complex. Creative
solutions will be required across all these questions and about how
to enable transnational social networks and mobility to continue to
function. Clearly, every opportunity to facilitate return in conditions
that are safe, secure, dignified and sustainable should not fail to be
realized. At the same time, as long as the reality of violence, conflict
and serious abuses of human rights continues critically to characterize
the situation in Somalia, pressure to end protracted displacement of its
thousands of refugees should be balanced with ensuring that a protection space remains available for those who will continue to need it.
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Timeline of Events related to Somali Displacement in the Region}
1977–78

Border war between Somalia and Ethiopia sent approximately
650,000 refugees (Ethiopian Somalis) to Somalia

May 1988 Beginning of fighting between Somali National Movement (SNM)
and Government of Somalia. Bombardment of Hargeisa and
beginning of displacement of people to Somalia
1988–91

Influx of refugees from Somaliland to Ethiopia and Djibouti

Jan 1991

President Siad Barre ousted from power

1991–94

Self-organized repatriation of refugees from Ethiopia to Somaliland

1991–92

Escalation of displacement from South/Central Somalia to Kenya,
Ethiopia, Djibouti

Dec 1992 US-backed Operation Restore Hope launched in Somalia
1991–92

Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps established in Kenya

1992

Refugee boat crossings to Yemen begin to escalate (jump from
30,000 to 60,000 in one year); UNHCR opens assistance operation in
Yemen for Somali refugees

1992–94

Cross-Border Operation for return of Somali refugees from Kenya
to South/Central Somalia

Mar 1993 Emergency conditions in refugee camps in Kenya stabilized
May 1993 UNOSOM took control of operations from US-led UNITAF
1997

Repatriation from Ethiopia and Djibouti to Somaliland and
Puntland launched (bulk of operation continues until 2000, small
numbers returned until 2005)

Dec 2006 Ethiopia invades Somalia, ousts Islamic Courts Union
Jan 2007

African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) led by Uganda
established

2008

Dolo Ado camps in Ethiopia established

Jan 2009

Ethiopia withdraws from Somalia, hands control to AMISOM/TFG
forces

Jan 2011

Distress migration out of Somalia to all countries in the region
begins to rise

July 2011 Famine is declared in 2 regions of Southern Somalia (Bakool, Lower
Shabelle)
Aug 2011 Famine is declared in a further 3 areas of Southern Somalia
(Afgoye, Middle Shabeele, IDP camps in Mogadishu)
Feb 2012 UN declares famine over, 260,000 people are said to have died;
800,000 sought refuge outside the country during the crisis
Sept 2012 Transitional Federal Government cedes power to new government,
with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President
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Notes
1. Sources: a) Internal displacement estimates: 1990–2000 from Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003: 27, 40; 2001–2004 from Internal Displacement Monitoring Unit, 2010; 2005–2012
from UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, 7 Oct 2013, and UNHCR, 2013.
Where range given, mid-point used. Data missing for 1991 and 1993. b) Figures for refugees living in neighbouring countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen) taken from
UNHCR Statistical Online Database, 1 February and 7 October 2013, and UNHCR, 2013.
2. According to UNHCR’s Online Statistical Population Database, Ethiopia hosted
513,950 and Kenya hosted 285,619 Somali refugees in 1992.
3. Ambroso. 2002.
4. Ambroso 2002, 17.
5. Ambroso 2002.
6. UNHCR. 1992.
7. Toole and Bhatia, 1992.
8. Ambroso 2002, 16.
9. Centers for Disease Control. 1992.
10. Africa Rights/Human Rights Watch. 1993.
11. UNHCR 1996.
12. UNHCR 1994.
13. Hammond and Vaughan-Lee. 2012.
14. The actual number of returnees was much smaller than those who received repatriation packages, a reflection of the large numbers of local residents who had registered
as refugees, people who had multiple ration cards, and those who chose to return to
Somaliland on their own. Ambroso notes that the numbers of people on UNHCR-provided transport from Ethiopia was in some cases only 40% of the number of repatriation
packages given (2002).
15. Lindley, 2010.
16. ICRC. 2012.
17. NutritionWorks 2013.
18. UNHCR Population Statistics Database.
19. Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, citing UNHCR statistics.
20. RMMS. 2013.
21. DRC 2013, 30.
22. York University 2013.
23. DRC 2013, p. 8–9.
24. Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2013.
25. DRC 2013, citing Campbell et. al. 2011, p. 7.
26. See for instance: Al Jazeera, 7 Oct. 2013.
27. UNHCR Population Statistical Database.
28. For a discussion of ‘near’ and ‘far’ diasporas see N. Van Hear. 2003.
29. All sources: UNHCR Country Offices, figures expected as of Dec. 2013.
30. DRC 2013, 32.
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31. Desert Rose Consulting. 2012.
32. DRC 2013, 33.
33. FSNAU. 2013.
34. DRC 2013, 26, citing UNHCR figures.
35. DRC. 2013. p. 8.
36. DRC. 2013 p. 8.
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